{"controller"=>"catalog", "action"=>"show", "id"=>"264015549"}
  • EN
  • DA

Danish NationalResearch Database

  • Search Publications & Researchers
  • Open Access Indicator
  • Publications
  • Researchers
Example Finds records
water{} containing the word "water".
water supplies"{}" containing the phrase "water supplies".
author:"Doe, John"author:"{}" containing the prase "Doe, John" in the author field.
title:IEEEtitle:{} containing the word "IEEE" in the title field.
Need more help? Advanced search tutorial
  • Selected (0)
  • History

Moral Hazard and Stability

    • Save to Mendeley
    • Export to BibTeX
    • Export to RIS
    • Email citation
Authors:
  • Tumennasan, Norovsambuu
    Close
    Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus BSS, Aarhus University
DOI:
10.1007/s00355-014-0802-2
Abstract:
Economists perceive moral hazard as an undesirable problem because it undermines efficiency. Carefully designed contracts can mitigate the moral hazard problem, but this assumes that a team is already formed. This paper demonstrates that these contracts are sometimes the reason why teams do not form. Formally, we study the team formation problem in which the agents’ efforts are not verifiable and the size of teams does not exceed quota r . We show that if the team members cannot make transfers, then moral hazard affects stability positively in a large class of games. For example, a stable team structure exists if teams produce public goods or if the quota is two. However, these existence results no longer hold if efforts are verifiable.
Type:
Journal article
Language:
English
Published in:
Social Choice and Welfare, 2014, Vol 43, Issue 3, p. 659-682
Main Research Area:
Social science
Publication Status:
Published
Review type:
Peer Review
Submission year:
2014
Scientific Level:
Scientific
ID:
264015549

Full text access

  • Doi Get publisher edition via DOI resolver
Checking for on-site access...

On-site access

At institution

  • Aarhus university.en

Metrics

Feedback

Sitemap

  • Search
    • Statistics
    • Tutorial
    • Data
    • FAQ
    • Contact
  • Open Access
    • Overview
    • Development
    • FAQ
    • Contact
  • About
    • Institutions
    • Release History
    • Cookies and privacy policy

Copyright © 1998–2018.

Fivu en