1 School of Culture and Society - Philosophy, subject, School of Culture and Society, Arts, Aarhus University2 School of Culture and Society - Philosophy, subject, School of Culture and Society, Arts, Aarhus University
When a proposition might be the case, for all an agent knows, we can say that the proposition is epistemically possible for the agent. In the standard possible worlds framework, we analyze modal claims using quantification over possible worlds. It is natural to expect that something similar can be done for modal claims involving epistemic possibility. The main aim of this paper is to investigate the prospects of constructing a space of worlds—epistemic space—that allows us to model what is epistemically possible for ordinary, non-ideally rational agents like you and me. I will argue that the prospects look dim for successfully constructing such a space. In turn, this will make a case for the claim that we cannot use the standard possible worlds framework to model what is epistemically possible for ordinary agents.
Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2014, Vol 43, Issue 1, p. 153-170