1 Department of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science, Technical University of Denmark
The European Commission has launched a study on the applicability of existing chemical industry safety provisions to enhancing security of chemical facilities covering the situation in 18 EU Member States. This paper reports some preliminary analytical findings regarding the extent to which existing provisions that have been put into existence to advance safety objectives due to synergy effects could be expected advance security objectives as well. The paper provides a conceptual definition of safety and security and presents a framework of their essential components. Key differences are presented. A safety framework is examined with the intent to identify security elements potentially covered. Vice versa, a security framework is examined with the intent to identify safety elements potentially covered. It is concluded that synergies are largely absent at the preventive level. Synergies exist at the mitigation level. At the strategic policy level, synergies are obvious. The security of chemical facilities is important. First, facilities with large inventories of toxic materials could be attractive targets for terrorists. The concern is sabotage causing an intentional release that could endanger neighbouring populated areas. Second, facilities where high-risk chemicals are present could present opportunities for theft. The concern is that relatively small amounts of highly toxic chemicals could be taken to another location selected for higher impact. The Directive on European Critical Infrastructures (ECI Directive) addresses facility security but does not cover the chemical sector. Chemical facility safety at EU level is addressed by way of the Seveso-II Directive. Preliminary estimates by the chemical industry suggest that perhaps 80% of the existing safety measures under Seveso-II would also be instrumental in terms of raising security. Synergies of this magnitude would imply little need for additional chemical facility legislation. This paper finds no support for the idea that strong synergies exist at chemical facility level.
International Meeting on Chemical Safety and Security: Meeting Proceedings, 2012, p. 73-83
Main Research Area:
International Meeting on Chemical Safety and Security, 2012
The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)