The question of pricing train paths for "open access" railway networks in North America is discussed. An auction process is suggested as necessary to maintain transparency in the contracting process. Multiple random samples of auction pricing for a single track railway line demonstrate that the infrastructure entity will receive approximately 15.6% less than the true value of the contracted train paths. This loss of revenue threatens the objective of reducing government subsidy for the railway network. (C) 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Transportation Research. Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 2013, Vol 49, Issue 1, p. 176-189
Business and International Management; Management Science and Operations Research; Transportation; Pricing; Railway scheduling; Timetabling; Train pathing; accessibility; pricing policy; railway transport; subsidy system; transportation system; North America; ENGINEERING,; OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTATION; ECONOMICS; MANAGEMENT; AUCTIONS