We study the international standard XACML 3.0 for describing security access control policy in a compositional way. Our main contribution is to derive a logic that precisely captures the idea behind the standard and to formally define the semantics of the policy combining algorithms of XACML. To guard against modelling artefacts we provide an alternative way of characterizing the policy combining algorithms and we formally prove the equivalence of these approaches. This allows us to pinpoint the shortcoming of previous approaches to formalization based either on Belnap logic or on D -algebra.
Lecture Notes in Computer Science: 8th International Symposium, Facs 2011, Oslo, Norway, September 14-16, 2011, Revised Selected Papers, 2012, p. 205-222
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Lecture Notes in Computer Science
8th International Symposium on Formal Aspects of Component Software (FACS 2011)