This paper attempts to generalize findings of the traditional literature of transaction cost economics (Willamson, 1971, 1973, 1975, 1985; Ouchi, 1980; Williamson & Ouchi 1981) by introducing more general factors or variables. Two of the most important of these are that asset specificity is replaced by a more general condition, vulnerability, and that the so-called market failure condition is replaced by a condition called contractual non-triviality. Sufficient conditions for non-triviality are found in terms of specific set of values for the basic set of factors.
Asset specificity; Bounded rationality; Complexity; Contract; Goal incongruence; Human behaviour; Incomplete contracting; Market failure; Mechanisms of protection; Opportunism; Ouchi, W.G.; Relational contracting; Transaction; Transaction cost; Uncertainty; Williamson, Oliver E.
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2nd Nordic Workshop on Interorganizational Research, 1992