This paper will consider the phenomenological disclosure of the reflecting-body vis-à-vis subject’s reflective acquaintance with other minds. To this end, phenomenological accounts regarding the double-sided disclosure of the lived-body will be expounded and developed. It will be argued that the latter can, and must, be considered as synchronously disclosed across the subject’s pre-reflective and reflective modes of acquaintance. Further, in order to maintain the distinction between these modes, it will be argued that a differential configuration of the lived-body’s double-sidedness must be admitted across these modes. To this end, observations regarding the lived disclosure of reflective acts vis-à-vis their embodied conduct are provided; suggesting that a partial inversion of the lived-body’s double-sidedness occurs during the transition to the reflective mode. Directions for future research concerning subjects’ developing acquaintance with other minds and its perturbance are briefly considered.