1 Department of the History of Ideas, Faculty of Humanities, Aarhus University, Aarhus University2 Department of Business Communication, Aarhus BSS, Aarhus University3 Department of Business Communication, Aarhus BSS, Aarhus University
After some introductory and partly critical considerations about fundamental trust - as it is conceived by the Danish phenomenologist K. E. Løgstrup in his ‘Analysis of trust' in the first section of his work The Ethical Demand - this paper explores two ways of constituting what I call non-fundamental trust. For this purpose I work with two examples. The first one concerns a rather passive constitution of non-fundamental trust bound up with perception, the other one concerns a rather active constitution of non-fundamental trust bound up with imaginative intentionality. Both examples have their source of inspiration in phenomenological philosophers, namely Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jean-Paul Sartre. As an intermezzo I reflect upon the experience of a compromised personal freedom, which I consider in relation to the examples that I give and to our conference theme, ‘trusting the new', as well.