Delegated leadership and international bureaucrats in international institutional bargaining
Our argument in this paper is that even in what can be termed a ‘least likely’ case of states negotiating between themselves on creating new or reforming existing rules of cooperation for an institution, states are often dependent upon international bureaucrats to help them translate their relatively vague common interests into actual contractual agreements. We develop a theory of delegated leadership that explains why and when we should expect international bureaucrats to matter in institutional bargaining between states, and apply the theory in two case studies: the negotiation of the 1996-97 IGC and the institutional provisions of the Uruguay Round. It is argued that when governments are dependent upon international bureaucrats, this gives the bureaucrats opportunities to skew the final deals closer towards their own pro-integrative and bureaucratic-legalistic preferences.
International Studies Association 2006 Annual Convention, 2006
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47<sup>th</sup> Annual International Studies Association Convention, 2006
Department of Political Science, University of Aarhus and University of Copenhagen