1 Department of Economics, Aarhus School of Business, Aarhus BSS, Aarhus University2 Centre for Research in Integration, Education, Qualifications and Marginalization (CIM), Aarhus School of Business, Aarhus BSS, Aarhus University3 Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus BSS, Aarhus University4 University of Applied Sciences Nuernberg5 Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus BSS, Aarhus University
This paper develops a hedonic model of job security (JS). Workers with heterogeneous JSpreferences pay the hedonic price for JS to employers, who incur labor-hoarding costs from supplying JS. In contrast to the Wage-Bill Argument, equilibrium unemployment is strictly positive, as workers with weak JS-preferences trade JS for higher wages. The relation between optimal job insecurity and the perceived dismissal probability is hump-shaped. If firms observe demand, but workers do not, separation is not contractible and firms dismiss workers at-will. Although the workers are risk-averse, they respond to the one-sided private information by trading wage-risk for a higher JS. With two-sided private information, even JS-neutral workers pay the price for a JS guarantee, if their risk premium associated with the wage-replacement risk is larger than the social net loss from production.
Book of Abstracts, 2008
Job security; Hedonic market; Implicit contract theory