1 Department of Business Studies, Aarhus School of Business, Aarhus BSS, Aarhus University2 Finance Research Group, Aarhus School of Business, Aarhus BSS, Aarhus University3 Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus BSS, Aarhus University4 Universität Karlsruhe5 Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus BSS, Aarhus University
This paper examines the effect of debt and liquidity on corporate investment in a continuous-time framework. We show that stockholder-bondholder agency conflicts cause investment thresholds to be U-shaped in leverage and decreasing in liquidity. In the absence of tax effects, we derive the optimal level of liquid funds that eliminates agency costs by implementing the first-best investment policy for a given capital structure. In a second step we generalize the framework by introducing a tax advantage of debt, and we show that an interior solution for liquidity and capital structure optimally trades off tax benefits and agency costs of debt.
Journal of Corporate Finance, 2010, Vol 16, Issue 2, p. 243-258
investment timing; liquidity; agency costs of debt; capital structure; real options